St. Thomas and the Divine Origin of Law: Some Notes by Dewan, Lawrence
Lawrence Dewan, O.P.*
Recibido: 6 de octubre de 2008 - Revisado: 28 de octubre de 2008 - Aceptado: 2 de noviembre de 2008
St. Thomas and the Divine Origin of Law:
Some Notes
Santo Tomás y el origen divino de la ley: algunas
anotaciones
Resumen
En este estudio se presenta una serie de anotaciones sobre el concepto de
ley y su relación con Dios en la antigüedad clásica, específicamente
tomando los puntos de vista de Aristóteles y Santo Tomás de Aquino.
Palabras clave
Derecho, Filosofía, Teología, Summa Theologica.
Abstract
This article presents a series of notes on the concept of Law and its
relationship to God in Classical Antiquity, specifically taking into account
the viewpoints of Aristotle and Saint Thomas Aquinas.
Key words
Law, Philosophy, Theology, Summa Theologica.
* Profesor de Filosofía y Teología en el Colegio
Dominicano de Ottawa y como profesor adjunto
del Departamento de Filosofía y miembro de la
Facultad de Postgrados y Estudios Post-
doctorales de la Universidad de Ottawa.
124 LAWRENCE DEWAN, O.P.
Univ. Sergio Arboleda. Bogotá (Colombia) 8 (15): 123-134, julio-diciembre de 2008
Human life is a social life, and law is one of
its most essential features. It is a rational ordering
of that life. That law exists is evident, but there
is room for exploration of its nature and causes.
The theory of law, or the knowledge of the
foundations of law, pertains to metaphysics or
primary philosophy. Why this is so we can gather
from an observation of Aristotle near the
beginning of his treatise The Parts of Animals.
He is there teaching about the nature of physical
science or “philosophizing about nature,” and is
stressing the importance of studying the nature
of the form of the thing, and not merely the
matter. In the study of living things, that form is
called a “soul.” But he then raises the question:
whether the “whole” soul or only some “part” of
it comes within the province of natural science?
And the answer runs:
Now if it be of the whole soul that this should treat,
then there is no place for any other philosophy
beside it. For as it belongs in all cases to one and
the same science to deal with correlated subjects
– one and the same science, for instance, deals
with sensation and with the objects of sense – and
as therefore the intelligent soul and the objects of
intellect, being correlated, must belong to one and
the same science, it follows that natural science
will have to include the whole universe in its
province. But perhaps it is not the whole soul, nor
all its parts collectively, that constitutes the source
of motion; but there may be one part, identical with
that in plants, which is the source of growth, another,
namely the sensory part, which is the source of
change of quality, while still another, and this not
the intellectual part, is the source of locomotion. I
say not the intellectual part; for other animals than
man have the power of locomotion, but in none
but him is there intellect. Thus then it is plain that
it is not of the whole soul that we have to treat. For
it is not the whole soul that constitutes the animal
nature, but only some part or parts of it. (Aristotle,
On the Parts of Animals, translated in 1882, ¶ 1.I.).
By “the animal nature” here, Aristotle is
referring to that which all animals have in
common. What is proper to the human animal as
human is omitted from natural science. The
human being, by virtue of intellect, is seen here
as related to the whole of reality.  Aristotle is
clearly of the view that only metaphysics, the
science whose range includes all things,1 can
adequately study the human being as to what is
proper to that being.
Now, law pertains to humans and is proper to
rational or intellectual substances.2 It is only by
determining the proper place of the human mind
within the whole of reality that we will understand
law, viewing it in the context of its foundations.
Let us call this “the sapiential vision of law.”
That all law has a divine origin is a doctrine
not difficult to find in the writings of Thomas
Aquinas. At Summa Theologica (hereinafter ST)
1-2.93.3 the explicit point is that all law derives
from the eternal law, eternal law which has
already been explained as “the plan of divine
wisdom inasmuch as it is directive of all acts and
movements.” (St. Thomas, Summa Theologica,
¶ 1-2.93.1).
Prior to this, the locating of the discussion on
law, within the moral part of the ST, already
suggested this doctrine. The ST, and in general
the work of St. Thomas, is meta-philosophical. It
is a study and teaching of what has been revealed
to us by God himself, and thus surpasses mere
human wisdom, i.e. philosophy. However,
revelation presupposes the order of nature, and
Thomas’s teaching envelops philosophy rather
than excluding it. (St. Thomas, Summa
Theologica, ¶ 1.2.2.ad 1).
In the 1-2, the more summary overall picture
of the moral order, the treatment begins with
beatitude, the ultimate goal of human life, as
something whose attainment depends in a
measure on human action (St. Thomas, Summa
Theologica, ¶ 1-2.5.7); it then speaks of that
action, its principles within the human agent, viz.
the virtues; and finishes with the extrinsic
principles of that action, primarily God. So
presented, God is seen as guide by virtue of law
and support by virtue of grace.3 Law thus is
presented as a divine influence. One might think
that this means merely that some special sort of
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law, the “divine law” specially revealed to us by
God, is such a help. As the 1-2 carefully develops
the overall causal picture, one sees that “law”
names a reality found according to priority and
posteriority, flowing from the divine intellect and
will, and remaining, wherever properly found, a
rational participation in that divine reality.
Thomas begins with a general presentation
of the essence of law, and does so by considering
primarily law as human beings make it. His
general definition is:
… [law] is nothing other than an ordering by reason
towards the common good, promulgated by one
who has responsibility for the community. (St.
Thomas, Summa Theologica, ¶ 1-2.90.4).
Once this is done, he presents the variety of
kinds of law: eternal, natural, human, and divinely
revealed laws.4
As already mentioned, eternal law is the plan
of direction of the universe present within God
himself. It is thus identical with God himself (St.
Thomas, Summa Theologica, ¶ 1-2.9.1.1 ad. 3).
This obliges us to reflect on the sort of unified
field the general term “law” names. Early in the
ST, i.e. q. 13 of the first part, Thomas explained
the way in which human language bears upon
divine things. This is the doctrine of “the divine
names.” What do we mean when we say the
words “good” or “wise” of God? We learn that it
is through a sort of analogy that “good” is said
of God. To say: “God is good” is not to say merely
that God is the cause of the goodness of
creatures, or merely that God is “not bad.” Rather,
we mean that what we call “goodness” in
creatures exists by priority, in a higher way, in
God (St. Thomas, ST, ¶ 1.13.2). Thus, as regards
the reality named, it is found more truly in God
than in creatures, whereas the name applied is
applied first to that which is found in creatures,
and has the mode of signifying appropriate for
creatures. (St. Thomas, ST, ¶ 1.13.6).
All this surely applies to “law” as well. It is a
word invented to name the human reality, but it
is said properly of the eternal law which is in
God, and indeed that is what most of all deserves
the name “law”.5
The presentation of eternal law gives the most
dominating metaphysical vision of the domain of
law. We then can see the way that, within the life
of the rational creature which is man, there is a
root of all man’s law-making, a root in what is
called “natural law.” (St. Thomas, ST, ¶ 1-2.95.2.)
Presenting eternal law, in ST 1-2.91.1, St.
Thomas immediately recalls the presentation of
divine providence in ST 1: We read:
… law is nothing else than a dictate of practical
reason in the leader who governs some perfect
community. Now, it is evident, given that the world
is ruled by divine providence, as was had in book
1, that the whole community of the universe
[communitas universi] is governed by divine
reason. And therefore the very plan [ratio] of the
government of things present in God as in the
governor [principe] of the universe has the
intelligible note [ratio] of law. And because divine
reason [ratio] conceives [concipit] nothing
temporally, but rather has an eternal concept
[habet aeternum conceptum], as is said in
Proverbs 8.23,6 one ought to call such law “eternal”
(St. Thomas, ST, ¶ 1-2.9.1.1.).
Providence was discussed in ST 1.22, and the
full sapiential vision of law must include that
teaching. In my brief presentation today, I wish to
focus on one feature of the doctrine of natural
law. Natural law is presented as the rational
creature’s participation in the eternal law (St.
Thomas, ST, ¶ 1-2.9.1.2.) It is properly called
“law,” something that cannot be said of the eternal
law’s participation by lower, non-rational creatures.
Natural law is properly law because of the human
being’s participation in providence, as rationally
providing in some measure for himself.7 We are
not, of course, the source of the legislation; rather,
it is in us as in those who are ruled and measured
by it. (St. Thomas, ST, ¶ 1-2.9.1.2.).
Natural law is possessed by the human being
primarily through the vision of what goodness is,
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a vision which attests to our immediate relation
to the universal cause of being and goodness.8
What is primary in Thomas’s presentation of law
is its being rational, an expression of reason (St.
Thomas, ST, ¶ 1.2-90.1.) The vision of that
reasonableness is the source of the obligation it
presents to us.9 However, two essential features
of law are that it be made by the one responsible
for the common good for which it is law, and that
it be promulgated to those subject to the law. I
take this to mean that law only appears in its
adequate reasonableness when it is so
promulgated as to reveal its proper origin. This
raises the question of natural law’s adequate
promulgation. And it is this issue that I wish to
revisit here today.
So much is it an issue that in the article on the
necessity for promulgation of law, in the question
on the definition of law, an objection is based
precisely on the case of natural law. One finds
what is essential to law maximally in natural law,
says the objector, and yet it stands in no need of
promulgation. To this Thomas replies:
… it is to be said that the promulgation of the law
of nature [legis naturae] is from the very fact that
God places it within the minds of human beings
so as to be naturally known [naturaliter cognos-
cendam] (St. Thomas, ST, ¶ 1-2.90.4 ad. 1.)
Now, for this reply to be sufficient, it seems
to require that our knowledge of natural law
include an appreciation of divine providence as
its source.
This is a point on which Suarez insisted in his
presentation of natural law (Suarez, 1856a). He
explains that the issue is not whether the natural
law come from God as author of natural
reason, but rather if it comes from him precisely
as a legislator. He holds that it comes to us in
such a way that we know it is from God as from
a legislator.10
The ultimate objection to this in Suarez’s
discussion bears upon the need for God to
intimate to the human being what the law is. For
law really to be law, there must be, not only the
will of the legislator in the matter, but also the
intimation or insinuation that that is his will. Here
Suarez answers that intimation of the will follows
with the same necessity (as he had earlier
mentioned), viz. from the perfection of divine
providence. And thus the very judgment of right
reason naturally inserted in man is the sufficient
sign of that divine will, nor is any other insinuation
necessary. And he says:
The proof is, that the judgment of reason indicates,
just by virtue of itself, divine providence of a sort
fitting for God, and morally necessary for his full
lordship and due subjection of man to him, in which
providence this legislation is contained. Further-
more, for this reason it is known through natural
reason that God is offended by sins which are
done against natural law, and their punishment
pertains to him, and judgment [in their regard]:
therefore, the natural light itself is, just by itself,
the sufficient promulgation of natural law, not
only because it manifests the intrinsic
inappropriateness or appropriateness of acts,
which the uncreated light of God shows: but also
because it intimates to man [hominis, sic; lege
homini] that the contrary actions displease the
author of the nature, as the supreme Lord, and
care-giver, and governor of that same nature:
therefore, this is sufficient intimation of that law,
as Thomas judges in 1-2.90.4.ad 1 (Suarez, 1856b,
p. 112A).
He is referring to Thomas’s saying that the
promulgation of natural law is sufficient, by virtue
of God’s inserting it into our minds so that it is
naturally known. The point here seems to be that
we have by natural reason11 some knowledge of
a perfect providence, and thus we see our
natural knowledge as the expression of a law.12
In a previous paper13 I sketched an interpre-
tation of Thomas in this regard. Since then Kevin
Flannery (2001) has presented a line of thinking
on this point based on Thomas’s admission that
in our natural knowledge of beatitude as the end
of life there is included a sort of knowledge of
God as himself beatitude (and thus a sort of innate
knowledge that God exists). This teaching by
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Thomas occurs where he is arguing that the
proposition “God exists” is not known just by
virtue of itself to the human mind. He is
confronted with the authority of St. John
Damascene teaching that there is in us an innate
knowledge of the existence of God. He replies:
… it is to be said that to know that “there is a god”
in some general way, subject to some confusion,
is naturally inserted in us, i.e. inasmuch as God is
[what constitutes] the happiness of man; for man
naturally desires happiness, and that which is
naturally desired by man is naturally known by
him. But that is not to know, unqualifiedly, that
there is a god, just as to know “someone is
coming” is not to know Peter, even though it is
Peter who is coming; for many reckon that the
perfect good of man, which is happiness, is riches;
some [that it is] pleasures; and some something
else (St. Thomas, ST, ¶ 1.2.1 ad. 1.)
As one can see here, this “knowledge of God”
is such just to the extent that “knowledge of
someone” is “knowledge of Peter”. This hardly
seems an adequate basis for arguing the
promulgated character of natural law.
Flannery (2001, p. 44) makes his argument in
considering the precept of natural law that we
are to love God with all our heart. The love of
God is described by Thomas as a first and
common precept of natural law, known by virtue
of itself to human reason, either by nature or by
faith; it, together with the second commandment
of love of neighbor, is related to the Decalogue
as principle to conclusions (St. Thomas, ST, ¶ 1-
2.100.3 ad. 1). Flannery is taking into
consideration the teaching of St. Thomas that the
existence of God is a demonstrable conclusion
rather than a propo-sition per se nota quoad
nos. How, then, can the precept: “love God” be
so known? His solution, I would say, amounts to
substituting for the precept: “love God” the
precept “love happiness” or “seek happiness”,
on the basis of the teaching of St. Thomas that
the existence of God is thus known in a way, in
that we have a natural desire for happiness and
God is in fact happiness.14
This is hardly satisfactory. What we are
speaking of are, after all, among the best known
items in the domain of practical reason. Consider
what is said about the precept to love God above
all else. For example:
That which is maximally and firstly natural to man
is that he love the good, and most especially the
divine good and the good of one’s neighbor.15
Moreover, it is natural to love God more than
ourselves by a friendly love, not merely a
concupiscible love; and our love for happiness is
merely concupiscible.16
Flannery claims to be taking his cue from
Thomas commenting on Aristotle’s Nicoma-
chean Ethics, as follows:
And it can be said that all men have appetite for
the same delight in virtue of natural appetite,
though not, nevertheless, according to their own
judgment; for not all reckon in their heart nor say
orally that the same delight is best; still, nature
inclines all to the same delight as to the best, viz.
to the contemplation of intelligible truth, inasmuch
as all men by nature desire to know. And this
happens because all have naturally within
themselves something divine, viz. the inclination
of nature which derives from the first principle; or
else the very form which is the principle of this
inclination.17
Now this involves moving from whatever
people judge and say they find supreme pleasure
in to their actually finding supreme pleasure in
the contemplation of intelligible truth. However,
that move does not take us from what is humanly
known intuitively (we desire happiness) to what
is known only through demonstration or reasoning
(happiness is to be found in God). Thus, it does
not really provide a model for what Flannery
(2001) is doing with “love happiness” standing in
for “love God”.
However, Flannery (2001) also makes
reference to SCG 3.38 (2161) though he does
not quote it.18 This, in fact, is quite a different
doctrine from the one he has featured. It is not
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about an implicit knowledge of God through an
actual knowledge of happiness. It is about a
remarkable dimension of our natural life, viz. a
natural reasoning to a conclusion that God exists.
We should not envisage the natural dimension of
our cognitive life merely in terms of simple
apprehensions of such items as being, unity, act
and potency.19 We should not even limit the picture
to the primary axioms, such as the impossibility
for the same thing to be and not be.20 Rather, a
further dimension of what is naturally conferred
on us is our natural reasoning. Three texts come
to mind. There is the just mentioned SCG item.
There is ST 2-2.85.1, on natural law as requiring
the offering of sacrifice to God, and, least known
of all, there is Thomas’s commentary on Psalm 8,
a text from his final academic activity in Naples.21
The SCG text occurs in a context where it is
already clear that ultimate human happiness
consists in a knowledge of God. Thomas is
beginning a series of chapters in which various
modes of human knowledge of God are considered
as possible candidates for such happiness, a series
beginning with the most imperfect knowledge.
Thus, Thomas speaks of a knowledge had by
pretty well everyone, the sort of knowledge of God
which has led some thinkers to say that such
knowledge is “per se notum”. He himself holds
that it is really the result of “natural reason”
[naturali ratione] proceeding from our expe-
rience of the order of natural things to an orderer
of natural things. The stress is on the imperfection
of the knowledge, the “confused” character of the
knowledge. One should note particularly, in the
same chapter, that a person who does not have
such knowledge is morally blameworthy. Thus, it
is knowledge very much linked to our common
membership in the moral order.
While the SCG text relates the reasoning to
our experience of “the order of natural things”,
the ST 2-2 text is more closely linked to our
experience of our own imperfection. We read:
... natural reason [naturalis ratio] declares
forcefully [dictat] to man that he is placed under
some superior [being], because of the defects
which he experiences in himself, with regard to
which he needs to be aided and directed by some
superior. And whatever that [superior] is, this it is
which among all [men] is called “a God”. But just
as, in natural things, the lower are naturally placed
under the higher, so also natural reason strongly
declares to man, in accordance with natural
inclination [naturalis ratio dictat homini
secundum naturalem inclinationem], that he
[should] exhibit, in a way in keeping with his own
self, submission and honour to that which is above
man (St. Thomas, ST, ¶ 2-2.85.1).
Here the resulting precept is not precisely the
love precept, but rather pertains to the virtue of
religion, the highest form of justice (St. Thomas,
ST, ¶ 2-2.122.1.) Nevertheless, what interests
us is the nature of the knowledge of God that is
involved, the fruit of natural reasoning. And it
is seen as universal, i.e. pertaining to man by his
very nature.
Lastly, and in many ways most impressively,
we have the comment on Psalm 8, speaking of
the manifest character of the divine greatness,
seen by mere “infants”. There had previously
been mention in the psalm of the majesty of God.
Thus, Thomas says:
Then, when he says: Out of the mouth [ex ore],
he shows that it [the majesty of God] is maximally
manifest. And firstly he shows the manifestness;
secondly the reason for it, there [where he says]:
Because I will see [Quoniam videbo].
That it is manifest he proves: because that is
manifest which is placed within [inditum] all, no
matter how simple [they are], as by a sort of natural
knowledge [quasi quadam naturali cognitione].
For there are two sorts of men who follow natural
and right instinct [naturalem et rectum
instinctum], viz. the simple and the wise. That the
wise know God is no great matter; but that the
simple do is [a great matter]. But there are some
who pervert the right instinct, and these people
reject knowledge of God. Cf. Ps. 81: They have not
known, i.e. they willed not to know, nor have they
understood etc. Cf. Job. 22: They have said to
God: Go away from us; we do not want your ways.
But God has brought it about that through them,
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i.e. through the simple people who follow the
natural instinct, are confounded those who pervert
the natural instinct. By “infants” the simple are
signified, cf. 1 Peter 2: Like new-born infants,
reasonable, without guile. Therefore he [the
Psalmist] says: Your name is admirable; but in
such a way that out of the mouth of infants and
nurselings you have brought praise to perfection,
[you] who interiorly instigate to this; and this
because of your enemies, who oppose your science
and knowledge. Cf. Phil. 3: Enemies of the cross
of Christ etc. ... This takes place when the simple
recognize God, and others pervert the study of
natural knowledge, lest they know God himself.22
Though Thomas speaks of a “natural
knowledge” had by the simple, and of them
following “natural instinct”, he still sees this
phenomenon as having its reason, its source, in a
grasp of the cosmic situation.23 He sees the
common man as spontaneously sizing things up,
somewhat as in the SCG and ST 2-2 texts.
It seems to me perfectly acceptable that the
natural love which man has for God more than
for his own self be seen as following from this
natural knowledge of God which man has by a
spontaneous, inborn reasoning to the existence
of God. I think this is better than attempting to
see such a primary precept as “love God above
all else” merely in the way it is present in the
desire for happiness.
The natural love for God above all else, even
oneself, is present in every creature, but in each
according to its own mode or measure.24 In the
rational creature, i.e. angels and man, it is “in the
mode of will”. Such natural love presupposes
natural intellectual knowledge of God.25 In the
angel such knowledge is a mediated intuition (St.
Thomas, ST, ¶ 1.56.3). In the human being, it is a
natural conclusion, the fruit of a spontaneous,
universally inborn discursive operation. Our
intellectuality is “rational”, as possessed of a weaker
light than the angelic (St. Thomas, ST, ¶ 1.58.3.)
Notice that it is inasmuch as God is known as
the author of being, life, and intelligence that he
cannot be hated, but must be loved (St. Thomas,
ST, ¶ 2-2.34.1). That we need a commandment
concerning such love stems from the possibility
(through habituation to sin) of our not living
according to it in particular choices.26
My understanding is, then, that Thomas
presents the existence of God as naturally known
to all, even though naturally reasoned to. That
someone professes ignorance of the existence of
God stems from moral disorder (as the Psalms
Commentary as well as the SCG text asserts). I
would say that this natural knowledge would fill
out the picture of the commandment of love as
known by virtue of itself to all. Given that one has
knowledge of God as the author of being, one has
knowledge of him as lovable by us, indeed as more
lovable that ourselves.27
Notas
1 For the point that metaphysics or primary
philosophy or wisdom speaks of all things, cf.
Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.2 (982a8, 21-23; b2-7,
17; 983a8-9).
2 As we shall see, “law” is said of the non-
rational only by way of similarity; taken too literally,
“the laws of the physical world” would amount to
anthropomorphism: cf. ST 1-2. 91.2.ad 3.
3 ST 1-2.90.prologue; the distinction between
law and grace, guidance and support, is not hard
and fast: what is most truly the New Law is the
grace of the Holy Spirit: 1-2.106.1. - God is
extrinsic to created reality in the way that the
efficient cause is other than its effect; he is so
present to every creature as to be most deeply
within it, because of the nature of his proper effect,
the act of being; we may say that his immanence
flows from his transcendence: cf. ST 1.8.1.in toto.
4 ST 1-2.91 in toto. – For simplicity’s sake I
omit the “law of sin” (cf. 1-2.91.prologue) pre-
sented in a. 6.
5 I have spoken here of “law” along the lines
that Thomas teaches concerning the positive,
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absolute names such as “goodness” and “wisdom”.
It is true that the word “law” suggests, when said
of God, a relation to creatures. However, I take it
that it is the sort of relation to creatures that is
involved in all divine acts of understanding and
willing of creatures. They are said of God as
being in him eternally (ST 1.13.7.ad  3), and this
is true of “law” also, as is clear in such texts as
ST 1-2.91.1.
6 The Vulgate, at Proverbs 8.22-24, has
wisdom say:
[22] Dominus possedit me ab initio
viarum suarum, Antequam quidquam faceret
a principio. [23] Ab aeterno ordinata sum, et
ex antiquis antequam terra fieret. [24]
Nondum erant abyssi , et ego iam concepta
eram… [The Lord possessed me from the
beginning of his ways, before he had made
anything, from the beginning. From eternity I
was ordered, and from of old, before the earth
was made. The depths were not yet, and I
had already been conceived.]
7 ST 1-2.91.2.ad 3. The participation by non-
rational creatures in the eternal law “cannot be
called ‘law’ save by likeness.”
8 ST 2-2.2.3 (ed. Ottawa, 1416a6-17). So true
is this that in some texts Thomas identifies natural
law simply with the natural light of reason whereby
we know the difference between the good and
the bad. - We read in a sermon given in Lent of
1273, entitled Collationes de decem praeceptis,
and sometimes De duabus praeceptis caritatis
et decem legis praeceptis, that the natural law
just is the light of the human intellect conferred by
God on the human being at creation:
… lex naturae; et haec nihil aliud est
nisi lumen intellectus insitum nobis a deo,
per quod cognoscimus quid agendum et quid
vitandum. Hoc lumen et hanc legem dedit deus
homini in creatione. [… the law of nature;
and this is nothing else but the light of the
intellect placed within us by God, through
which we know what is to be done and what
is to be avoided. God gave man this light and
this law in creating [him]]
As described by James Weisheipl, Friar
Thomas D’Aquino, Garden City, N.Y., 1974:
Doubleday, “… the points in the vernacular
sermon were jotted down and later written out in
Latin ‘after Thomas had preached’” [p. 402] by
one of Thomas’s secretaries, Friar Peter d’Andria
[p. 319]; and so one must be prepared for a sort
of “short-hand” way of speaking.
That the intellectual light spoken of here
is to be identified with the agent intellect we see
in such a passage as the following, from the
Disputed Questions on Spiritual Creatures 10
[a work dated 1267 in Rome, according to the
Leonine editor, B.-C. Bazan.]:
… we say that the light of the agent
intellect about which Aristotle speaks is
immediately impressed on us by God, and in
function of it we distinguish the true from
the false, and the good from the bad. And
it is about that that the Psalm says: “The many
say: who will show us good things? The light
of your countenance has been stamped upon
us, O Lord,” i.e. [the light] through which
what are good are shown to us. Thus,
therefore, that which produces in us actual
intelligibles, in the mode of participated light,
is something of the soul and is rendered
multiple in keeping with the multitude of souls
and of human beings.
It should be underlined that actual
knowledge of the first intelligibles and first truths
is a product of abstraction from sensible expe-
rience, not something inborn; the intellectual light
or agent intellect must derive information from
sensible things even as regards the first notions
and first truths: cf. Qq. de anima 5, De veritate
11.1, Quodlibet 10.4.1 [7].
9 Reason as ordering towards the end is the
principle of obligation here: cf. ST 1-2.90.1 and
1-2.99.1. - In so speaking I by no means wish to
obscure the element of inclination which the law
includes. Such inclination is, intrinsically, a sort
of loyalty to the reasonable. Thus, in speaking, in
ST 1-2.91.2, of the eternal law as regulating all
of creation, St. Thomas speaks first of all things,
inasmuch as they participate in the impression
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coming from God, as having natural inclinations
towards their proper acts and goals; he goes right
on to say that inasmuch as the rational creature
has a more excellent participation in divine
providence, as itself providing for itself and others,
it too participates in the eternal law by having
natural inclination to the due act and end. Yet in
concluding this very passage, what Thomas points
to as natural law in us is the light of natural reason
by which we discern the good from the bad. The
properly human inclination is rooted in the light
of natural knowledge. Cf. also the treatment of
our natural human “inclination” in ST 1-2.62.3,
as including knowledge and appetitive
movement. Cf. my paper, “Jacques Maritain and
the Philosophy of Co-operation,” in Alterité.
Vivre ensemble differents ed. M. Gourgues and
G.-D. Mailhiot, Montréal and Paris, 1986:
Bellarmin/Cerf, 109-117.
10 This, of course, is precisely what Thomas
shows in ST 1-2.91.1 and 2. God as princeps of
the universe is the supreme legislator, pronoun-
cing the eternal law (a. 1), and natural law is a
participation in the eternal law (a. 2).
11 What I mean here by “natural reason” is a
spontaneous reasoning process found in all
humans (as will emerge in what follows).
12 I think that in this matter Suarez is better
than Maritain. Maritain in the posthumously
published study, La loi naturelle ou loi non écrite
(Texte inédit, établi par Georges Brazzola),
Fribourg, Suisse, 1986: Éditions Universitaires, pp.
105-111, takes the position that the natural law
depends on reason, “not on will”: “Loi naturelle
dépend de la Raison, non du vouloir”. Thus, in his
table on p. 106, he has this very explicitly. Thomas
Aquinas’s position is portrayed as divine reason
issuing in the natural law which enters man through
the natural inclinations, thus bringing us to the
precepts. This seems to me quite wrong, most of
all in the expression “not on will”. Obviously, law,
for Thomas, is an expression of reason. However,
it is the work of the governor, and this providential
role is presented by Thomas, very explicitly, as
“what pertains simultaneously to intellect and will”:
cf. 1.22.prologue, and a. 1.ad 1, on God as giving
precepts. Cf. also ST 1-2.97.3.ad 1: “… dicendum
quod lex naturalis et divina procedit a voluntate
divina…” (and cf. the entire article). Thus, also,
Maritain’s criticism of Suarez (in the same context)
on this issue as non-Thomistic is wrong.
13 “St. Thomas, Our Natural Lights, and the
Moral Order,” Maritain Studies / Études
maritainiennes (Ottawa) 2 (1986), 59-92 [reprinted
in Angelicum 67 (1990), 285-307]. – I added to this
in “Natural Law and the First Act of Freedom:
Maritain Revisited,” Études Maritainiennes /
Maritain Studies 12 (1996), pp. 3-32.
14 He refers us, in nn. 57 and 58, to ST 1.2.1.ad
1, In Boet. De trin. 1.3.ad 4 and to DV 22.2.
15 ST 2-2.34.5:
Id autem quod est maxime et primo
naturale homini est quod diligat bonum, et
praecipue bonum divinum et bonum proximi.
16 On friendly natural love for God more than
for ourselves, cf. ST 1.60.5; whereas the love of
God involved in his being our happiness might be
thought of as concupiscible love: cf. ST 1-
2.2.7.ad 2.
17 In EN 7.13.14, where Thomas is explaining
Aristotle at 7.13 (1153b31-32):
Et potest dici quod omnes homines
appetunt eamdem delectationem secundum natu-
ralem appetitum, non tamen secundum proprium
iudicium; non enim omnes existimant corde, neque
dicunt ore eamdem delectationem esse optimam,
natura tamen omnes inclinat in eandem delecta-
tionem sicut in optimam, puta in contemplationem
intelligibilis veritatis, secundum quod omnes
homines natura scire desiderant. Et hoc contingit,
quia omnia habent naturaliter in se ipsis quiddam
divinum, scilicet inclinationem naturae, quae
dependet ex principio primo; vel etiam ipsam
formam, quae est huius inclinationis principium.
18 In n. 58 he refers to SCG 3.38. In n. 57 he
mentioned in more detailed fashion ST 1-2.89.6.
I notice that F presents the topic of 1-2.89.6 as
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whether it is possible for a youth to sin venially
before sinning mortally. The topic is rather whether
one can have only original sin and venial sin on
one’s soul (no mortal sin). The answer is no. The
idea is that before one can commit a venial sin
one must either get rid of original sin or one will
commit a mortal sin. Thus, it is quite possible,
according to the doctrine, to sin venially before
sinning mortally. This is so, if one first turns to
God, thus eliminating original sin, and then sins
venially. The doctrine in this text, with its ad 3
about the obligation to turn to God at the very start
of the moral life, I would say should be read in the
light of the doctrine of natural reasoning that I
mention below. However, Cajetan read it as
requiring one to recognize, through deliberation,
only the bonum honestum as such (as one’s proper
end), rather than actual knowledge of and turning
to God; cf. my paper: “Natural Law and the First
Act of Freedom: Maritain Revisited”, Études
Maritainiennes /Maritain Studies 12 (1996), pp.
3-32, in the section on Cajetan ca n. 27.
19 Thomas Aquinas, Sententia libri ETHICORUM
Aristotelis 6.5 (ed. Leonine, t. 47-2, Rome, 1969:
Ad Sanctae Sabinae, lines 102-106 (concerning
Aristotle at 1141a12-17) (ed. Pirotta, #1181):
... existimamus quosdam esse sapientes
totaliter, idest respectu totius generis entium...
illa quae est sapientia simpliciter est certissima
inter omnes scientias, inquantum scilicet attingit
ad prima principia entium, quae secundum se
sunt notissima, quamvis aliqua illarum, scilicet
immaterialia, sunt minus nota quoad nos.
Universalissima autem principia sunt etiam
quoad nos magis nota, sicut ea quae
pertinent ad ens inquantum est ens: quorum
cognitio pertinet ad sapientiam sic dictam,
ut patet in quarto Metaphysicae. [my italics]
and Thomas, CM Prologue:
… illa scientia maxime est intellectualis,
quae circa principia maxime universalia ver-
satur. Quae quidem sunt ens, et ea quae conse-
quuntur ens, ut unum et multa, potentia et actus.
20 St. Thomas describes this as the maximally
first principle: cf. CM 3.5.6.
21 This work is presented by James Weisheipl,
Friar Thomas D’Aquino: His Life, Work, and
Thought, Garden City, N.Y., 1974: Doubleday
and Co., pp. 368-369 and pp. 302-304, as Postilla
super Psalmos. Ps. 1-54 (Naples, 1272-1273).
He explains that the given title reflects the use
of the psalms in the liturgy of the Church, but
that Thomas is really writing what would be more
properly and simply described as Super Psalmos
(incomplete). [p. 303]. Speaking of the period
Sept. 29, 1272 to December 6 1273, from the
beginning of the academic year 1272-1273 to the
moment in the following term when Thomas
stopped writing, Fr. Weisheipl says that “this is
the only academic work that can be attributed to
this period with certainty.” [p. 302] By “academic
work” here is meant actual lecturing; the Super
Psalmos is a reportatio by Reginald of Piperno,
Thomas’s personal secretary.
22 The commentary continues, speaking of the
celestial phenomena as the ground of the natural
reasoning, in keeping with the text of the psalm:
Next, he subjoins the reason for this
manifestness, saying Because [Quoniam].
Tully says in the book De natura deorum, and
it was said also by Aristotle, though in those
books of his that we have among us it is not
found, that if some man were to enter a palace,
which he would see [to be] well disposed, none
is so lacking in intellect [amens] that, even
though he would not see how it had been made,
he would not perceive that it had been made
by someone. And this the order of the celestial
bodies especially shows. For there were some
who, erring, attributed the causes of things to
the necessity of matter: hence, they said all
had been made because of the warm, the cold,
the dry, and the wet: as by the elements which
have these properties. But this, if it can have
an appearance [of truth] regarding other things,
can in no way [have such appearance] in [the
case of] the celestial bodies; for they cannot
be attributed to the necessity of matter, where
one is so distant from the other, and they take
so great a time to complete their course. That
cannot be traced back to anything but an
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intelligent cause. And so Scripture, when it
wants to manifest the power of God, directs
us to a consideration of the heavens....
23 Clearly the presentations in the SCG and
the In Psalm. relate to Thomas’s “fifth way” of
proving the existence of God (ST 1.2.3). It is also
notable that it is this line of thinking, purpose as
opposed to chance as a source of the cosmos,
which is presented in Thomas’s popular sermons
on the Apostles’ Creed, concerning the existence
of a God. Cf. In Symbolorum Apostolorum
expositio, in Opuscula theologica, t. II, ed. R.
Spiazzi, O.P., Rome and Turin, 1954: Marietti,
#869. Here Thomas insists on the regularity of
the celestial movements. This work also dates
from 1273, in Naples. And once again, Thomas
speaks of the rarety and stupidity of people who
do not believe that the cosmos is governed.
24 Notice that Thomas carefully presents this
doctrine three times in the ST, viz. at 1.60.5, at 1-
2.109.3, and at 2-2.26.3.
25 Notice first of all the argument sed contra
of ST 1.60.1. - In ST 1.60.1 it is seen that natural
love is present in each creature according to its
own mode, and that for angels and men, this is
“secundum voluntatem”. In 1.59.1 it was seen
that will is the most perfect mode of inclination
towards the good, in that it follows upon the
intellectual vision of goodness, considered
universally. In 1.60.5.ad 1 it is seen that all
naturally love God more than themselves, each
in its own mode (and notice that the sed contra
there links this love to the natural law).
26 Cf. ST 1-2.99.2.ad 2:
… it is to be said that it was fitting for
the divine law that it provide for man not only
as to those matters which are beyond the
capacity of reason, but also as to those
concerning which it does occur that human
reason suffer impediment. Now, human
reasion concerning the moral precepts, as
regards the most common precepts of the
natural law, could not err, taking them
universally, but nevertheless, because of
habituation in sinning, it has been obscured
regarding particular things to be done…
Cf. also ST 1-2.100.5.ad 1, as to why the ten
commandments speak of our duty to God and to
our neighbor, but not of our duty to ourselves:
… the precepts of the decalogue are
related to the precepts of love. But a precept
had to be given to man concerning the love of
God and neighbor because in that respect the
natural law had been obscured because of sin;
not as regards the love of himself, because in
that respect the natural law was still in vigour…
Cf. also 1-2.109.3, on our natural love for God
above all else, and the effect of original sin.
27 As I have often pointed out, the first level
of natural inclinations spoken of in ST 1-2.94.2 is
the natural inclination common to all creatures; it
is not ordered merely towards the preservation
of the individual self. It covers everything spoken
of in ST 1.60 as natural love: love of the individual
self, love of one’s species more than the individual
self, and love of God more than oneself or any
creature. The second level of inclination in that
text is not about reproduction, for that is common
to all substances, but about the perfect animal
mode of reproduction. The third level is not about
love of God, but about seeking the truth about
God, as well as living in society: the rational
animal by nature desires to know, and especially
to know the truth concerning God.
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